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CONES NOW the Appellant and supplements its brief previously 
filed herein as follows, to-wit: 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT NO. III: INAPPLICABILITY OF "SINGLE CRIMINAL 
EPISODE" STATUTE 
Appellant expresses awareness of this Court's recent 
opinion in the case State of Utah vs. Edward Lane Cornish, 
filed September 1, 1977, and also its recent opinion in the 
case State of Utah vs. Steven A. Ireland, filed October 4, 1977. 
Absent a stipulation by counsel, these decisions would dictate 
the conclusion that the offenses in question were not part of 
a "single criminal episode" since neither the requirement of 
closeness in time nor the requirement of sole criminal objective 
have been met. 
POINT NO. IV: THE STATUTORY PROSCRIPTION AGAINST 
"SUBSEQUENT PROSECUTIONS" HAS NO APPLICATION IN THE 
CASE AT BAR. 
The statute in question, 76-1-403, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
talks in terms of a "subsequent prosecution" and in terms of a 
"former prosecution." After the former prosecution has termi-
nated as per the statutory guidelines, then there cannot be a 
subsequent prosecution. The provisions prevent what in some 
iurisdictj,,11·c, is a common practice of "wearing a defendant 
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-down" by filing a new charge after the jury has returned a 
verdict of acquittal. 
The controlling factor in determining the applicability of 
the statute under discussion rests on what is meant by a 
"subsequent prosecution." 
section 76-1-302(2) provides that: 
"A prosecution is commenced upon the finding and 
filing of an indictment by a grand jury or upon 
the filing of a complaint or information." 
(Emphasis added) 
In the subject case the Defendant was charged by the 
arresting officer with three separate offenses. All were 
commenced simultaneously and, of primary significance, all 
were active prosecutions before a disposition as to any one 
was reached. It would seem, therefore, that any discussion 
about "former prosecution" or "subsequent prosecution" is 
rendered inapplicable as to these three offenses. The Defendant, 
as was his right, appeared and plead guilty on two of the 
offenses and not guilty on the third offense. The State, as 
was its right, sought then to continue prosecution on the third 
offense. 
If the Court were to adopt a position contrary to the one 
advanced herein, the net result would be to allow a defendant 
to choose among the offenses charged, race to the justice of 
the peace, plead guilty to the favored one, and thereby sum-
ffiilrily conclude the entire matter against him. Such an absurd 
r~sult is nul con temp lated by the statutes nor would it foster 
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onY useful or suGstantive purpose or right to which either the 
defendant o.r the s til te is entitled. 
The suggested construction leaves fully intact the 
protection which the statutes seem designed to afford a defendant 
who comrni ts more than one criminal offense in a single criminal 
episode. In such cases the defendant knows he cannot be sub-
jected to separate trials for multiple offenses [Section 76-1-402(2)) 
and, with certain limited exceptions, a defendant knows that when 
he goes to trial the charges against him are fixed and there 
cannot be a "subsequent prosecution." [Section 76-1-403(1)) 
The thrust of the statutes when read together and given 
fair construction requires the prosecution to file all offenses 
within its knowledge growing out of a single criminal episode 
prior to the trial on any of such offenses and assures the 
defendant that he can neither be subjected to a "multiplicity 
of suits" nor to a "subsequent prosecution" after the filed 
charges have been disposed of. As such the statutes are con-
sistent with fair play and serve salutary objectives, benefiting 
not only the defendant but the Court in its effort to handle 
criminal matters in an orderly, expeditious manner. To the 
contrary, the position advanced by the respondent would serve 
no useful purpose, would tend to make a game out of the admini-
stration of justice, and would tend to require a defendant to 
plead guilty on all charges or not guilty on all charges. 
Such would disrupt the defendant's right to acknowledge his guilt 
~," tu so1nc LJU t not al 1. While the concept is rarely given voice, 
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thP right to plead guilty is equally as important as the right 
to plead not gui 1 ty · The State is without entitlement to 
_ e or unduly limit either right. 
COt::'LC 
S U M M A R Y 
Absent the stipulation of counsel the case would be 
disposed of under the principles announced in the Cornish 
and Ireland decisions. Beyond the concern of those cases 
is the threshold question of whether or not there is a 
"subsequent prosecution." If the answer to that question 
is in the negative, as it must be here, then the point 
previously raised by appellant concerning the jurisdiction 
of a single court need not be reached. All prosecutions 
herein had been commenced and all were active before any 
were disposed of, hence any inquiry re exceptions to the 
"subsequent prosecution" proscription would be moot. 
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